Ideas · RiskNew · November 17, 2026

Nvidia Insured Its Board, Not Its Balance Sheet. Would Yours Hold?

Nvidia’s D&O protects its directors, not the company’s balance sheet.

A founder’s overnight exit is now two lawsuits and a public risk decision. What Nvidia transferred to insurers, what it retained against more than $50 billion in cash, and what founders, boards and private equity sponsors should transfer, retain and fund before their own bad day.

Updated Nov. 17, 2026 · Ahead of Nvidia’s earnings after the close

The short version · 1 minute

A founder’s sudden exit is one event, whether the cause is death, disability or misconduct. Most companies insure it in pieces, and a different person holds each piece.

D&O and EPL pay for the fight. Key person life, COLI and a funded buy-sell replace the person and the equity, and the succession plan holds the company together in between.

The failures sit at the hand-offs between those pieces.

  • The policy may protect the directors and not the company’s balance sheet.
  • Defense bills erode the limit that must protect directors.
  • An ousted founder’s claim falls between D&O and EPL.
  • A resignation may not trigger the crisis sublimit.

Key person life and disability policies pay on death or disability, not on a resignation or a for-cause termination. A misconduct exit therefore leans on the succession plan, the employment agreement, the D&O/EPL program and any COLI cash value.

Many of these terms can still be negotiated at renewal while pricing stays flat. Give one person ownership of the whole picture, and work through the checklist at the end of this article.

The event map

One founder event, five owners.

Founder death, disability or misconduct-driven exit · owners vary by company

Five owners. One event. Usually, no one holding the whole picture.

This map is that picture. Open any square for the gap and the fix, and follow the numbers to see who depends on whom.

Read it before the bad day, not during it.

The map below follows one founder event through four stages. Each cell shows the tool that responds, who usually holds it, and where the hand-off tends to fail.

Owners vary by company. In a business with no formal board or no general counsel, the same jobs still exist, and someone still has to hold them.

The numbered cells mark where one owner’s coverage depends on another’s. Those links are where programs fail even when each policy looks fine on its own.

Where the silos connect

  1. 1Some crisis-communications triggers count a death only if key person life is in place
  2. 2An ousted executive’s claim must land in one policy, EPL or D&O, not the gap between
  3. 3Every defense bill drains the shared limit that Side A DIC must protect
  4. 4COLI cash value can fund an interim leader and retention when no death benefit is paid
  5. 5The succession plan says who leads next; the buy-sell says who buys the equity

Who owns the whole picture?

Most insurance programs were bought to satisfy a closing checklist, not to survive a bad day. A founder can leave overnight. The wording in your policies won’t change by morning.

Sean P. Conrad

01The headline every board just read

On Thursday, Nvidia announced that Jensen Huang had resigned as president, CEO and director. CFO Colette Kress was named interim CEO, and Harvey C. Jones became the company’s first-ever chair of the board. No permanent successor was named, and the third-quarter earnings release stayed on the calendar for Tuesday, November 17.

The resignation capped a week that moved faster than most governance playbooks are built for:

  • The reported trigger was alleged personal conduct. Huang told employees he had been unfaithful to his wife. Reporting tied the relationship to a former executive of Singapore-based Megaspeed whom U.S. authorities reportedly concluded was a Chinese intelligence asset. Beijing has called that claim a smear. Press also reported a separate workplace relationship with a subordinate. Nvidia’s own filing gives no reason for the resignation.
  • The board opened an independent investigation, run by a committee of independent directors with outside counsel.
  • A securities class action was filed against Nvidia and Huang days before he resigned. It alleges that statements about Huang’s dealings with Megaspeed and chip-diversion risk misled investors.
  • A derivative suit followed against the directors, alleging they failed to oversee the company and ignored concerns about Megaspeed.
  • Congress asked for a briefing on China’s access to sensitive technology.
  • The stock repriced sharply as the story developed.

Huang served as CEO for all 33 years of the company’s history, at one of the world’s two most valuable companies. Commentators had already noted that Nvidia had no publicly disclosed succession plan, no COO, and roughly 60 direct reports to the CEO.

Every one of those features is common in founder-led private companies, from venture-stage startups to family-owned and sponsor-backed middle-market businesses. A private company has no deep public float to absorb the shock. Its insurance program was probably bought to satisfy an investor, a lender or a closing checklist, not for a bad day like this one.

Update · November 17, 2026 · Before Nvidia’s earnings

Who the policy actually protects

Last week I wrote that when a public company’s founder is the story, shareholders come through two doors: a securities suit and a derivative suit. Both are now open at Nvidia, and this week Reuters showed which one the insurance was built for.

Citing The Insurer, a Thomson Reuters publication, Reuters reports that Nvidia carries up to $950 million of insurance for its directors and officers. It does not carry the insurance that would typically pay the company’s own defense costs, settlements and judgments in securities litigation. The coverage pays eligible settlements or judgments that Nvidia cannot indemnify, protecting the directors’ personal wealth. A successful securities fraud claim against the company would come out of Nvidia’s own cash.

In D&O terms, that is Side A protection for the people and no securities cover for the entity. Reuters calls the choice unusual for a U.S. public company. One broker quoted in the piece pointed to a balance sheet “larger than that of many insurance companies.” Nvidia holds more than $50 billion in cash.

Securities class action · San Francisco

Names the company and Huang.

The company’s exposure. Per Reuters, Nvidia has no insurance for its own securities liability.

Derivative suit · San Jose

Names the directors.

Alleges failed oversight and a late investigation. This is where the $950 million is most likely to matter.

Reuters notes that settlements in derivative cases are almost always paid from insurance. The securities case is the one Nvidia would fund itself.

Nvidia can pay a stock-drop judgment from its own cash. Almost no private company can.

Private D&O usually covers the entity too, for a broad range of claims. That helps, but the company and its directors then draw on one limit, so each is protected only by what the other leaves behind. Nvidia chose its gap on purpose. Most private companies find theirs when the claim arrives.

Transfer or retain: what Nvidia’s choice teaches a private company

Every risk program comes down to two decisions: what to transfer to insurers and what to retain on the balance sheet. Nvidia’s are now public.

Transferred · to insurers

Directors’ and officers’ personal exposure.

Up to $950 million of D&O coverage, paying what the company cannot indemnify.

Retained · on the balance sheet

The company’s own securities litigation.

Defense costs, settlements and judgments, against more than $50 billion in cash.

Where the decision gets made. At Nvidia it was a choice: Reuters reports the company opted out of buying coverage for its own corporate liabilities. In a private company the same decision is spread across the board, the CFO, a risk committee if there is one, and the broker. Too often it is made by default, at renewal, when last year’s limit rolls over unread.

How it hits the balance sheet. A transferred loss becomes a known premium, and capital stays intact. A retained loss lands directly on cash and equity, usually at the worst moment. In a private company it can also strain lender covenants and dilute the owners.

Applied to a private company

  1. 01 · Retain only what you can fund

    Nvidia retained its securities exposure against more than $50 billion in cash. Most private companies cannot absorb an entity claim, a derivative-type claim and their own defense at once. Transfer what would impair the enterprise. Retain what you can pay.

  2. 02 · Transfer the people’s exposure on its own layer

    In a private program the company and its directors usually share one limit, and entity claims can drain it first. A dedicated Side A or Side A DIC layer keeps the individuals’ protection intact. Full severability keeps one executive’s concealment from being imputed to everyone else.

  3. 03 · Make retention a board decision

    Put every retained exposure in front of the board, with the CFO and a specialist broker, and write it down. A retention nobody chose is still a retention.

  4. 04 · Fund what you retain

    Size transferred limits for the bad day, not the average claim. Then fund the retained side. D&O pays for the fight. Key person coverage and COLI cash value fund the transition.

02Founder-driven companies: where key person risk is amplified

The more a company’s value depends on one person, the more one bad day costs.

That holds at every stage, from a seed-stage startup to a trillion-dollar public company.

In a founder-driven company, the founder is often the product vision, the top salesperson and the face of the brand. The founder also holds the relationship with lenders and key customers, and is the person investors backed. When that person leaves suddenly, all of those dependencies fail at once.

Table 1Four stages of founder risk

StageWhere the key person risk sitsWho tends to bring claimsWhat is often missing
Startup / venture-backedThe founder is the roadmap and the next raiseCo-founders, early investors, departing employees with equityMinimum D&O limits; no key person coverage; no carve-backs to the exclusion for insureds suing each other
Founder- or family-owned (no outside investor)The founder holds customer and lender relationships and signs the personal guaranteesFamily shareholders, minority partners, lenders, the founder’s estateNo formal board; an unfunded buy-sell; undocumented COLI consents; sometimes no D&O at all
Sponsor-backed middle marketThe investment thesis rests on the founder-CEO’s leadership and rollover equityMinority holders, co-investors, lenders, acquirersCapacity exclusion, run-off and “other insurance” gaps (Appendix C)
PublicThe founder is the market’s storyShareholders (securities and derivative suits), regulatorsA credible succession plan; limits sized for the bad day

Companies with no outside investor often carry the least protection. Travelers’ private D&O product manager says smaller and family-owned companies are the most underinsured and often skip D&O entirely.

No board is pressing for D&O, no fund is reviewing the program, and no one reads the policies until a claim arrives. Everything below applies to every private company. Two points, the capacity exclusion and “other insurance,” matter most where a fund holds board seats.

03Following the event

The Nvidia sequence gives the order: allegation, investigation, exit, lawsuits, communications, transition, buy-sell, and a possible sale. Each stage below names what goes wrong, what responds, the gap, the fix and the owner.

1The allegation, or the loss: day one

GapNvidia showed the value of a credible interim CEO, and the cost of having no permanent successor ready.

FixA named interim leader, an emergency delegation of authority and a board-approved communications protocol.

Ownerthe board for the plan; the CFO or GC for notice and wording. Detail: Appendix A.

A death or disability triggers key person life or disability coverage, if the company bought it. A misconduct allegation triggers nothing automatically.

D&O does not cover the conduct itself. A personal relationship is not an act taken as a director or officer. D&O covers the claims that follow: alleged failures of disclosure and oversight, investor suits and regulatory inquiries.

The first gap is the plan. Nvidia showed the value of a credible interim CEO, and the cost of having no permanent successor ready. The second gap is the application: many private policies impute what the signer, and often the CEO, knew to every insured.

The reporting since has sharpened the point. Reuters reports that Huang misled several of the company’s leaders, including its general counsel, about the relationship. Legal experts told Reuters that if the board forced him out once that came to light, it could help the directors defend the derivative suit. That is the case for severability: one executive’s concealment should not become every director’s problem.

The fix is a named interim leader, an emergency delegation of authority and a board-approved communications protocol. In the policy, negotiate full application severability and non-rescindable Side A coverage.

Back to the map

2The investigation

GapMany private D&O forms cover very little of that cost, or nothing.

FixAsk for pre-claim inquiry coverage for individuals and a derivative-demand investigation sublimit.

Ownerthe board and the GC. Detail: Appendix C.

The first phase at Nvidia was an independent board investigation with outside counsel. A board investigation of a founder’s conduct can easily run to seven figures before anyone files a claim.

Many private D&O forms cover very little of that cost, or nothing. The company’s own internal investigation is generally not a “claim” against an insured, so budget for it separately.

Ask for pre-claim inquiry coverage for individuals and a derivative-demand investigation sublimit. For reference, one carrier’s private company form includes a $500,000 derivative-demand evaluation sublimit. Lockton reports that insurers began sublimiting or conditioning entity investigation coverage in 2026, so negotiate before renewal.

Protect the directors doing the investigating. Fraud and personal-profit exclusions should apply only after a final, non-appealable adjudication, and one executive’s misconduct should not be imputed to others. In LACERS v. Sanford (Del. Ch. 2026), the court let claims proceed that a board ignored red flags of workplace sexual misconduct.

Back to the map

3The exit

GapWhen a removed founder sues the board, the policy may not respond at all.

FixCoordinate the D&O and EPL definitions, exclusions and “other insurance” clauses.

OwnerHR, with the GC. Detail: Appendix C.

A forced exit is an employment event. Wrongful termination, retaliation, defamation and discrimination claims by a departing executive usually fall under EPL, not D&O.

EPL forms typically exclude amounts owed under an employment contract, stock options and deferred compensation. Equity forfeiture and for-cause disputes are common in founder exits. They can land in a gap between D&O, EPL and the operating agreement.

D&O adds a second gap. Private policies generally exclude claims one insured brings against another, and former directors and officers usually stay insureds. When a removed founder sues the board, the policy may not respond at all.

Coordinate the D&O and EPL definitions, exclusions and “other insurance” clauses. Negotiate carve-backs to the insured-vs-insured exclusion for former directors and officers, whistleblowers, employment claims and independent derivative suits. Lockton also reports insurers seeking higher, separate retentions for claims by high earners.

Back to the map

4The lawsuits

GapA private D&O form usually covers the entity broadly, so the company and its individuals often share one limit.

FixAdd a dedicated Side A DIC layer that only individuals can access, and buy separate limits for D&O, EPL and fiduciary.

Ownerthe CFO or GC. Detail: Appendices A, B and C.

The securities class action is the public-company version of this risk. Private companies face the same exposure from more directions:

  • Minority investors, co-founders and family shareholders sue for breach of fiduciary duty, oversight failure or an unfair sale process.
  • Ousted founders and executives sue over termination, forfeited equity, clawbacks and retaliation.
  • Lenders, creditors and bankruptcy trustees pursue directors when a leadership crisis becomes a covenant breach or an insolvency.
  • Regulators look into the conduct behind the headline.
  • Acquirers bring claims after a sale over what was known before closing.

The data backs this up.

By the numbers · Private company D&O

AIG · Claims of $1M+

20%/23%

Shareholder & fiduciary claims (count / losses)

AIG analyzed private company D&O claims of $1 million or more. Shareholder and fiduciary-duty claims were about 20% of claim count and 23% of losses paid.

Chubb · Risk Survey

>1 in 4

Had a D&O loss in three years

Chubb reports that more than one in four companies surveyed had a D&O loss in a three-year period.

The gap is the shared limit. A private D&O form usually covers the entity broadly, so the company and its individuals often share one limit.

Nvidia sits at the far end of this spectrum. By Reuters’ account, its program protects the directors and leaves the company’s own securities liability on its balance sheet. A private form usually covers both, on one limit, so every dollar the company draws is a dollar its directors cannot.

In most management liability policies, every dollar spent on lawyers comes out of the same limit that pays settlements.

Costs are rising faster than limits. Aon reports defense costs at historic highs, with some outside-counsel partners billing above $2,000 an hour. One underwriter in Gallagher’s 2026 survey said legal costs are burning through the first three layers of some programs.

The risk is highest in insolvency. In the 2026 First Brands bankruptcy, former executives could reach $100 million of Side A-only coverage. The $100 million tower that also covered the company was frozen as property of the bankruptcy estate.

Size limits assuming defense consumes a large share of them. Add a dedicated Side A DIC layer that only individuals can access, and buy separate limits for D&O, EPL and fiduciary. Negotiate a fixed allocation and pre-approve counsel, including separate counsel for the founder.

Where a fund holds board seats, add two more. Remove or narrow the capacity exclusion for fund designees, and make the company’s policy expressly primary over the fund’s own coverage.

Back to the map

5The communications

GapA founder’s death or incapacity is commonly listed, but a resignation driven by alleged personal conduct often is not.

FixRead the crisis-event definition for death, incapacity, resignation, termination and misconduct allegations.

Ownercommunications, with the CFO or GC who holds the policy. Detail: Appendix D.

Management liability can pay for crisis communications, but only through a small, separately triggered sublimit. It is a first-party expense benefit that needs no lawsuit, only a “crisis event” as the policy defines it.

The gap is the trigger. A founder’s death or incapacity is commonly listed, but a resignation driven by alleged personal conduct often is not. Some forms count an executive’s death or incapacity only if the company carries key person life on that person.

The size is a second gap. Base forms often provide $25,000 (in carrier forms reviewed). The sublimit usually sits inside the aggregate limit, so every dollar spent on PR is a dollar less for defense.

Standalone reputational policies offer far more: limits of $25 million to $50 million. The current ones reviewed do not list key-executive loss, and they exclude fraud and intentional criminal acts.

Read the crisis-event definition for death, incapacity, resignation, termination and misconduct allegations. Check that the sublimit fits a multi-month engagement, and pre-approve the crisis firm. Align the key-executive trigger with the key person life coverage and the succession plan.

Back to the map

6Transition and retention

GapIn a 2026 NFP survey, 81% of employers said they cannot afford to lose top talent. Yet 49% had no executive benefits strategy for leadership transitions.

FixKey person life and disability should be sized to the actual economic loss.

Ownerthe CFO and benefits lead. Detail: Appendix E.

D&O and EPL pay for the fight. They don’t replace the person.

In a founder-led company, the value thesis often rests on one or two people. Investors and boards usually model that risk through earn-outs, rollover equity and non-competes. Far fewer have funded it.

In a 2026 NFP survey, 81% of employers said they cannot afford to lose top talent. Yet 49% had no executive benefits strategy for leadership transitions.

Key person life and disability should be sized to the actual economic loss. That includes lost earnings during a transition, recruiting and retention costs, covenant protection for lenders, and the valuation hit on exit.

A misconduct exit exposes the gap.

A term key person policy pays nothing, because no one has died.

A COLI program’s cash value is still an asset the company can draw on.

That cash value can help fund an interim leader, retention bonuses for the next tier, and executive search. Early values are often low, and gains on surrender are taxed as ordinary income.

Compliance decides whether the death benefit arrives tax-free. Under IRC §101(j), the insured must get written notice and give written consent before the policy is issued. The company must also file Form 8925 every year the policies are in force.

Back to the map

7The buy-sell and the estate

GapAn unfunded buy-sell clause is a promise the company may not be able to keep.

FixAny company whose buy-sell is funded with company-owned policies should review the structure.

Ownerthe CFO, benefits lead and estate counsel. Detail: Appendix E.

If a founder dies, becomes disabled or departs, the operating agreement should answer three questions. Who buys the equity, at what value, and with what money?

An unfunded buy-sell clause is a promise the company may not be able to keep. How it is funded matters too.

In Connelly v. United States (2024), a unanimous Supreme Court ruled on company-owned policies that fund a redemption. The proceeds count toward the company’s value for estate tax, with no offset for the obligation to buy the shares. The IRS valued that company at $6.86 million, against the estate’s $3.86 million.

Any company whose buy-sell is funded with company-owned policies should review the structure. Follow the agreement’s own valuation procedure; the owners in Connelly did not. A disability trigger is funded with disability buy-out insurance, not life insurance.

Back to the map

8If a sale or restructuring follows

GapOn a change in control, coverage for later wrongful acts usually ends, and the policy goes into run-off.

FixBuy a six-year run-off at or before closing, the market convention for private deals.

Ownerthe board and the CFO or GC. Detail: Appendices C and E.

Private D&O is written on a claims-made basis. On a change in control, coverage for later wrongful acts usually ends, and the policy goes into run-off.

The trigger can come sooner than expected. Some forms define “change in control” to include a change in board composition, not only equity ownership. Lockton warns that debt-to-equity swaps and lender takeovers can do the same.

Buy a six-year run-off at or before closing, the market convention for private deals. Tail premiums are often quoted at roughly 150% to 250% of the annual premium. Run-off limits do not reinstate, so match or exceed the expiring limits.

Make sure the run-off and go-forward wordings fit together, so one policy responds whenever the wrongful act happened. For acquirers, existing COLI with missing consents is a hidden tax liability on the very event the policy was bought for.

Back to the map

04Why now

The market right now favors buyers who act.

Pricing · Private company D&O

WTW · Oct 2026 outlook

Flat to +5%

Private D&O and Side A DIC renewals

WTW’s October 2026 outlook forecasts private company D&O and Side A DIC renewals at flat to +5%.

Lockton · Capacity

$50M

Towers most buyers can still build

Lockton reports that most buyers can still build towers up to $50 million.

Underwriters see the risk rising anyway.

Risk · D&O underwriters

Gallagher · 2026 survey

88%

Expect D&O risk to increase

In Gallagher’s 2026 survey of public company D&O underwriters, 88% expect D&O risk to increase.

Gallagher · 2026 survey

39%

Name the CEO as most important

And 39% name the CEO as the single most important person in managing D&O exposure.

The checklist

One checklist, by owner

Download the checklist (PDF)

Ask these about your own company, or about every company where you hold a board seat or a meaningful position.

Back to the map

Board

  • Is there a documented succession plan, with a named interim leader and an emergency delegation of authority?
  • Is the short list of internal candidates reviewed every year?
  • Is there a dedicated Side A DIC layer that only individuals can access?
  • Would one executive’s misconduct, or knowledge on the application, be imputed to the other directors?
  • How does the policy define “change in control,” and could a board reshuffle or a lender action trigger run-off?
  • Has the capacity exclusion been removed or narrowed for sponsor-designated directors?

Back to the map

CFO / GC

  • Is the D&O limit sized for a crisis, assuming defense costs erode it, or only for an average claim?
  • Does that scenario include entity defense, several individual defendants and a regulatory inquiry?
  • What carve-backs does the insured-vs-insured exclusion have, and would a removed founder’s claim be covered?
  • Are internal investigation costs and pre-claim inquiries covered, and is the rest budgeted?
  • Are counsel and rates pre-approved, including separate counsel for the founder?
  • Is six-year run-off pre-priced or pre-negotiated, and do the run-off and go-forward wordings fit together?
  • Is the portfolio company policy expressly primary over the fund’s GPL, and does that match the indemnification agreements?

Back to the map

HR

  • Do the D&O and EPL wordings work together for an executive’s termination, equity and retaliation claims?
  • Are the employment and equity agreements clear on for-cause termination, forfeiture and clawback?
  • Does the EPL policy carry a higher, separate retention for claims by high earners?

Back to the map

Communications

  • Would a founder’s death, incapacity or departure trigger the crisis-communications sublimit?
  • Is the sublimit realistic for a multi-month engagement, and does it sit inside or outside the limit?
  • Is the crisis firm pre-approved, and is there a board-approved communications protocol?

Back to the map

Benefits / Finance and estate counsel

  • Is key person life and disability coverage in place, and sized to the actual economic loss?
  • Is the buy-sell funded for every executive the investment thesis depends on, and reviewed since the 2024 Connelly decision?
  • Is every company-owned policy inventoried and matched to a purpose?
  • Are §101(j) consents on file, and has Form 8925 been filed every year?
  • If the exit is not a death, what cash value could fund interim leadership and retention?

Back to the map

Everyone

  • Who owns the whole picture?

If any answer is “I’d have to check,” that is the answer.

The bottom line

Nvidia had a deep bench of advisors, an independent board and a trillion-dollar market value. It still lost its founder in a matter of days, with two lawsuits already filed and an insurance program built to protect its directors, not its balance sheet.

Nvidia can afford that trade. A private company facing the same sequence, whether founder-owned or sponsor-backed, has a thinner balance sheet and more concentrated ownership. Its insurance program may never have been stress-tested.

The review is not complicated. It means reading the company’s policies the way a plaintiff’s lawyer would, before a plaintiff’s lawyer does. It also means making sure the people the investment depends on are protected and backed up.

Technical detail, policy-level tables and all sources follow in the appendix.

This article is for general information only. It is not legal, tax or investment advice, and policy terms vary by carrier and form. Coverage questions should be reviewed with qualified counsel and a specialist broker.

AppendixAppendix: technical detail

This appendix holds the policy-level detail behind the main article. It is organized by coverage and provision, for the person who has to read the wording. These are general market patterns, and wording varies by carrier. Confirm the structure in each policy.

AThe sides of D&O: who is protected when the founder is the story

D&O protects individuals, and for private companies the entity too, through separate insuring agreements that respond in different situations. Whether the founder at the center is protected depends on who sues, what is alleged, and whether the company will pay.

Table A1The sides of D&O

Insuring agreementWho it protectsWhen it paysRetention
Side AIndividual directors and officersWhen the company cannot or will not indemnify them (insolvency, legal prohibition, refusal)Generally none
Side BThe companyReimburses the company after it indemnifies its directors and officersYes
Side C (entity)The company itselfClaims against the company; broad for private companies, not limited to securities claimsYes
Side A DICIndividuals onlyExcess of the main tower. Drops down if underlying limits are exhausted or rescinded, an insurer fails, or the company refuses to indemnify. Often broader terms and non-rescindableNone

Nvidia shows the sides separating in real time. Reuters reports coverage of up to $950 million for its directors and officers, paying eligible settlements or judgments the company cannot indemnify, and no insurance for the company’s own securities liability. Shareholder counsel quoted by Reuters noted that Huang’s personal exposure on the securities claims is theoretically much larger than $950 million, but that plaintiffs would presumably seek to recover from the company first.

Private companies get one structural advantage. A private D&O form usually covers the entity for a broad range of claims, not only securities claims. That breadth is real, but it also means the company and its individual directors and officers often share a single limit. In a crisis, that is exactly where the problems start.

Here is how a typical private program responds when a founder is at the center of an event like this one:

Table A2How a typical private program responds

ScenarioHow the program typically respondsWhat to negotiate
Investors sue the founder and the company togetherSides B and C, or Side A if the founder is not indemnified. All draw on one eroding limitA priority-of-payments clause that pays individuals first; dedicated Side A
The company or board sues the founderExcluded under the insured-vs-insured exclusion in most forms. Side A DIC wording is often narrowerCarve-backs for derivative suits brought without board involvement, and for bankruptcy trustees and creditors’ committees
The founder fights a for-cause termination or equity forfeitureMainly an EPL question, and contract and equity amounts are usually excludedCoordinated D&O/EPL wording; clear employment and equity agreements
The founder’s fraud or personal profit is finally adjudicatedDefense is advanced until then. Coverage then ends for the founder, and the insurer may seek repayment“Final, non-appealable adjudication in the underlying action” wording
The company won’t or can’t indemnifySide A, then Side A DIC. Some forms apply the Side B retention when the company simply refusesSide A DIC with a refusal-to-indemnify drop-down
Other directors and officers who did nothing wrongProtected if the policy has severability, so one person’s conduct is not imputed to othersFull exclusion severability
Sponsor designees and investor directorsCovered as directors, subject to the capacity exclusion. The fund’s GPL usually sits excessCapacity carve-back; primary-over-sponsor wording
The company itselfSide C. Senior officers’ conduct is usually imputed to the entityImputation limited to a short list of officers

Is the founder’s conduct even covered? A personal relationship is not an act taken as a director or officer, so D&O does not cover the conduct itself. What it covers is the claims that follow: alleged failures of disclosure and oversight, investor suits, and regulatory inquiries. A relationship with a subordinate is mainly an EPL exposure.

The application risk. Many private policies impute what the application signer, and often the CEO, CFO or COO, knew to every insured. If a founder-CEO knew of a problem that was not disclosed, the insurer may try to rescind the policy for everyone. Negotiate full application severability and non-rescindable Side A coverage so innocent directors are not exposed.

The founder at the center often has the least protection: the personal conduct is not covered, a claim by the company is excluded, and an adjudicated fraud ends coverage. The program’s real job in that moment is to fund the founder’s defense until the facts are decided, and to protect everyone else regardless of the outcome.

BDefense costs: the coverage inside the coverage

In most management liability policies, every dollar spent on lawyers comes out of the same limit that pays settlements. Many buyers and boards assume the opposite.

Table B1Defense costs by line of coverage

LineUsual structureDefense outside the limit?Who typically controls the defense
Private company D&ODefense costs are part of “loss” and erode the limitRarely offeredEither: duty-to-defend forms (insurer picks counsel) or advancement forms (insureds pick, with consent or from a panel)
EPLErodes the limitSometimes, mainly for smaller accounts, at added costUsually duty to defend with panel counsel
FiduciaryErodes the limitRarelyUsually duty to defend
E&O / professionalErodes in most formsMore often than other lines, or as a separate claims-expense allowance, at higher premiumVaries by form
GPL / fund management liabilityErodes the limitRarelyUsually advancement; the fund picks counsel subject to consent

Why it matters in a founder crisis. A board investigation, a shareholder or securities suit, a regulatory inquiry and an employment claim can all run at once. Each defense bill draws down the same tower that must also fund any settlement and protect every other insured.

Costs are rising faster than limits. Aon reports defense costs at historic highs, with some outside-counsel partners billing above $2,000 an hour. One underwriter in Gallagher’s 2026 survey said legal costs are burning through the first three layers of some programs. Beazley notes that private company limits and retentions have not kept pace with record litigation spending. Under reimbursement forms, counsel rates above what the insurer allows can fall on the insured.

Why the defense provision is still the most valuable part. Even inside the limit, the insurer pays defense as bills come in, long before anyone knows who is at fault. Courts generally require defense costs to be advanced as they are incurred. Conduct exclusions wait for a final adjudication, and the insurer can seek repayment only if one is made. For a founder facing allegations, that advancement is often the difference between mounting a defense and not.

Terms that decide how far the defense dollars go:

  • Allocation. When a suit mixes covered and uncovered claims or defendants, “best efforts” or “relative exposure” wording lets the insurer advance only the share it believes is covered. Negotiate a fixed allocation, ideally 100% of defense costs.
  • Retention. The retention applies to defense costs under Sides B and C, so the company pays the first dollars of every defense. Side A generally has no retention.
  • Consent to settle (the “hammer”). If the insureds reject a settlement the insurer recommends, a full hammer caps the insurer at that amount plus defense to date. A soft hammer shares the cost above that amount between insurer and insured.
  • Counsel. Pre-approve counsel and rates before a claim, including separate counsel for a founder whose interests may conflict with the company’s.
  • State rules. New York, for example, limits how far admitted policies in some lines may let defense erode the limit unless the insured controls counsel and settlement. Large commercial buyers are often exempt.

FixSize limits assuming defense consumes a large share of them. Buy separate limits for D&O, EPL and fiduciary instead of one shared aggregate. Add dedicated Side A. Ask for defense-outside-limits quotes on EPL and E&O, where the market offers them.

Back to the map

CPolicy provisions detail

Most owners and investors can tell you their company’s D&O limit. Few can tell you how that policy would respond to the Nvidia sequence: a misconduct allegation, then an internal investigation, then a forced exit, then investor claims, and possibly a sale after that. These are the provisions that decide the outcome.

C1The insured-vs-insured exclusion: when the founder sues the board

Private D&O policies generally exclude claims that one insured brings against another. Former directors and officers usually stay “insureds” after they leave. So when a removed founder-CEO sues the board that removed them, or the board sues the founder, the policy may not respond at all unless the exclusion has been negotiated down.

FixNegotiate carve-backs for claims by former directors and officers after a separation period (as short as one year in some forms), for whistleblower and employment-related claims, for derivative claims brought without the board’s participation, and for claims brought by a bankruptcy trustee, receiver or creditors’ committee. Sponsor-specific forms can narrow the exclusion to “entity vs. insured,” but that does not help when the company itself sues the founder: that claim stays excluded.

C2The capacity exclusion: is your board designee actually covered?

In Goggin v. National Union (Del. Super. 2018), a Delaware court applied a capacity exclusion to deny coverage to two investor-affiliated directors of U.S. Coal. The alleged misconduct was tied to their roles with investment vehicles that bought the company’s debt, and the court read “arising out of” broadly. The decision was appealed, so confirm its current status before relying on it.

Any time a sponsor’s partner sits on a portfolio company board while their fund also lends to, invests in, or controls the company, this risk is live. It is most acute in rescue financing and distressed situations, which is exactly when claims show up.

FixRemove the capacity exclusion or narrow it, and get affirmative language confirming that sponsor designees are covered in their director capacity. Then check how the fund’s own GPL/management liability policy fits with the portfolio company’s policy.

C3“Other insurance” and indemnification priority: who pays first?

If the portfolio company’s D&O policy and the sponsor’s GPL policy each point to the other as primary, the designee can end up waiting while two insurers argue. Board designees expect the portfolio company to indemnify them and its D&O to respond first, ahead of the fund.

FixMake the portfolio company policy expressly primary over sponsor and investor coverage, and line that up with the indemnification agreements and the company’s charter. The fund’s own GPL policy should then sit excess of both the portfolio company’s insurance and its indemnity. A common manuscript form negotiated with counsel can settle these terms across a sponsor’s portfolio at once.

C4Change in control and run-off: the trigger may come sooner than you think

Private D&O is written on a claims-made basis. On a change in control, coverage for wrongful acts after the transaction usually ends, and the policy goes into run-off for the prior acts. Two points tend to surprise buyers:

  • Some forms define “change in control” broadly enough to include a change in board composition, not only a change in equity ownership. A leadership shake-up, a restructuring, or a lender taking board seats can trigger run-off without anyone noticing. Lockton warns that debt-to-equity swaps and lender takeovers can do the same, and WTW notes that some forms treat the appointment of a receiver or trustee as a change in control.
  • Waiving change in control keeps one tower shared by the old board and the new board. A claim by the new board against the old one can then fall into the insured-vs-insured exclusion.

FixBuy a six-year run-off at or before closing, the market convention for private deals. Tail premiums are often quoted at roughly 150% to 250% of the annual premium. Pre-negotiate run-off pricing where the market allows it. Make sure the run-off and go-forward wordings fit together so that at least one policy responds no matter when the wrongful act happened, and ask for claw-back language for interrelated acts that span the closing. Run-off limits do not reinstate, so match or exceed the expiring limits.

C5Shared limits and the case for Side A DIC

When entity coverage, defense costs and several defendants all draw on one limit, the individuals can find the tower exhausted before their own defense is over. That risk is highest in insolvency, where the company may be unable to indemnify or barred from doing so. In the 2026 First Brands bankruptcy, former executives could reach $100 million of Side A-only coverage, while the $100 million tower that also covered the company was frozen as property of the bankruptcy estate.

FixAdd a dedicated Side A / Side A DIC layer that only individual directors and officers can access. Side A generally carries no retention, though some forms apply the Side B retention when the company simply refuses to indemnify. Consider separate limits for each line and a priority-of-payments clause that puts individuals first.

C6Investigation costs: the Nvidia phase most programs don’t fund

The first phase of the Nvidia sequence was an independent board investigation with outside counsel. Many private D&O forms cover very little, or nothing, of the cost of an internal investigation or a pre-claim regulatory inquiry unless that coverage was specifically bought. A board investigation of a founder’s conduct can easily run to seven figures before anyone files a claim.

FixAsk for pre-claim inquiry coverage for individuals and a derivative-demand investigation sublimit, which is usually modest. The company’s own internal investigation is generally not a “claim” against an insured and is usually not covered at all, so budget for it separately. Lockton reports that insurers began sublimiting or conditioning entity investigation coverage in 2026, so negotiate it before renewal. For reference, one carrier’s private company form includes a $500,000 derivative-demand evaluation sublimit. Confirm what counts as a “claim” and when the duty to give notice kicks in.

C7Conduct exclusions and severability

Fraud and personal-profit exclusions should apply only after a final, non-appealable adjudication, and one executive’s misconduct should not be imputed to the other insureds. If one person’s alleged bad acts can take away coverage for the directors who were investigating them, the program has failed at the exact moment it was meant to work.

Delaware is also raising the stakes: in LACERS v. Sanford (Del. Ch. 2026), the court let claims proceed that a board ignored red flags of workplace sexual misconduct, and treated the CEO’s alleged concealment as a breach of loyalty, which exculpation does not cover.

C8Duty to defend vs. advancement, and control of counsel

Private forms are written both ways. Under a “duty to defend,” the insurer picks counsel and defends the whole suit if any part of it is covered, with no allocation fight. Under a reimbursement or advancement form, the insureds pick counsel, subject to the insurer’s consent or a panel list, and the insurer pays reasonable fees for covered matters.

In a high-stakes founder dispute, control of counsel usually matters more, because the founder’s interests may diverge from the company’s. Some forms let the insured choose between the two approaches. Section B covers how defense costs interact with the limit.

C9EPL: the ousted executive’s claim lives here, too

A forced exit is an employment event. Wrongful termination, retaliation, defamation and discrimination claims by a departing executive are usually handled under Employment Practices Liability, not D&O, and EPL forms typically exclude amounts owed under an employment contract, stock options and deferred compensation. Equity forfeiture and for-cause disputes are common in founder exits, and they can land in a gap between D&O, EPL and the operating agreement.

The reported workplace relationship at Nvidia shows how quickly a conduct story becomes an employment-practices exposure. Lockton also reports insurers seeking higher, separate retentions for claims by high earners, which is exactly where an ousted founder’s claim falls.

FixCoordinate D&O and EPL wordings, especially the definitions, exclusions and “other insurance” clauses, so that an executive’s termination claim lands in a policy that will actually respond.

C10Private company claims data and market conditions

The securities class action is the public-company version of this risk. Private companies have the same underlying exposure, and it comes from more directions:

  • Minority investors, co-founders and family shareholders sue directors for breach of fiduciary duty, oversight failure, or a sale process they think was unfair.
  • Ousted founders and executives sue over a for-cause termination, forfeited equity, clawbacks and retaliation.
  • Lenders, creditors and bankruptcy trustees go after the directors when a leadership crisis turns into a covenant breach or an insolvency.
  • Regulators and government inquiries look into the conduct behind the headline, including export controls, sanctions, data and foreign-influence questions.
  • Acquirers bring claims after a sale over things that were known, or should have been known, before closing.

The data backs this up. In AIG’s analysis of private company D&O claims of $1 million or more on policies issued from 2016 to 2020, shareholder and fiduciary-duty claims made up about 20% of claim count and 23% of losses paid. Chubb reports from its Private Company Risk Survey that more than one in four companies surveyed had a D&O loss in a three-year period, and nearly all of them were hit financially. An earlier Chubb survey put the three-year figure lower, at about 13%, though the two surveys differ in method. Allianz names insolvency as a key driver of D&O claims, especially for private companies, and it projects insolvencies to keep rising through 2026.

The market right now favors buyers who act. WTW’s October 2026 outlook forecasts private company D&O and Side A DIC renewals at flat to +5%, and Lockton reports that most buyers can still build towers up to $50 million. Underwriters see the risk rising anyway. In Gallagher’s 2026 survey of public company D&O underwriters, 88% expect D&O risk to increase, and 39% name the CEO as the single most important person in managing D&O exposure. Many of these terms can still be negotiated at renewal while pricing stays flat.

Travelers’ private D&O product manager says smaller and family-owned companies are the most underinsured and often skip D&O entirely.

DCrisis communications: the non-indemnity bucket

Management liability can pay for crisis communications, but only through a small, separately triggered sublimit, and a misconduct-driven exit may not trigger it at all. This is a first-party expense benefit. It needs no lawsuit, no wrongful act and no indemnity obligation, only a “crisis event” as the policy defines it.

Table D1Where crisis money can come from

Where the money can come fromWhat triggers itTypical sizeHow it works
Crisis management extension in private D&OA defined crisis event. Forms commonly list the death, incapacity or criminal indictment of an executive; some add key executive resignations, layoffs, regulatory announcements or bankruptcyOften $25,000 in base forms (in carrier forms reviewed); higher by negotiationReimburses the company for a PR or crisis firm the insurer approves. Usually sits inside the policy’s aggregate limit
Personal reputation expenses for executivesA crisis affecting the individual executiveOne AIG form: $100,000 per executive and $500,000 aggregate, plus $100,000 for the organizationPays a PR firm to protect the individual, not just the company
Side A DIC enhancementsVaries by formVariesSome broad Side A DIC forms pay for a PR firm to manage negative press for individual insureds
Standalone crisis management or reputational risk policyNamed perils such as abuse, discrimination, harm or damage by association. One market policy has cited harassment or bullying allegations against a senior executive. Current products reviewed do not list key-executive loss, and exclude fraud and intentional criminal actsUp to $25 million (with a $250,000 pre-loss crisis sublimit) or $50 million, in policies reviewedCrisis consultants on call, plus loss-of-profits cover once revenue drops past a set trigger

Does this event sequence trigger it? It depends on the definition. A founder’s death or incapacity is commonly listed. A resignation driven by alleged personal conduct often is not, unless the form names key executive resignations or a broad adverse-publicity event. Some forms count the death, incapacity or indictment of an executive only if the company carries key person life insurance on that person, which ties the two programs together directly.

AIG’s UK crisis communications extension, for example, lists a director’s sudden death or disability, criminal conviction, or a criminal or fraud investigation, but not a resignation. Don’t assume a standalone reputational policy fills the gap either: the current ones reviewed exclude fraud and intentional criminal acts.

Inside or outside the limit? Crisis sublimits usually sit inside the aggregate limit. AIG’s form, for example, makes the limit the aggregate for all crisis loss and all other loss. Every dollar spent on PR is then a dollar less for defense. Notice is short, too: Nexus Underwriting’s private company form requires notice within 30 days of the crisis and an itemized breakdown within 60 days of payment.

FixRead the crisis-event definition for the death, incapacity, resignation or termination of a key executive, and for allegations of executive misconduct. Check that the sublimit is realistic for a multi-month engagement with a crisis firm, and ask whether it can sit outside the limit. Pre-approve the crisis firm before anything happens. For a founder whose personal brand is the company’s brand, consider personal reputation expense cover or a standalone reputational risk policy, and align its key-executive trigger with the key person life coverage and the succession plan.

Back to the map

EKey person, COLI and buy-sell

D&O and EPL pay for the fight. They don’t replace the person.

In a founder-led company, the value thesis often rests on one or two people: the relationships, the technical vision, the customer trust, the ability to raise capital. Investors and boards usually model that risk through earn-outs, rollover equity and non-competes. Far fewer have funded it. In a 2026 NFP survey, 81% of employers said they cannot afford to lose top talent, yet 49% had no executive benefits strategy for leadership transitions.

E1The three parts of a key person strategy

  1. A real succession plan. That means a named interim leader, an emergency delegation of authority, a board-approved communications protocol, and a short list of internal candidates who are reviewed every year. Nvidia showed the value of having a credible interim CEO in place. It also showed the cost of having no permanent successor ready.
  2. Key person life and disability coverage, sized to the actual economic loss. That loss includes lost earnings during a transition, recruiting and retention costs for replacement leadership, covenant protection for lenders, and the valuation hit on exit. For founders and executives at this level, that often calls for large-case, entity-owned life insurance, structured with input from the company’s lenders, its operating agreement and any sponsor’s exit timeline.
  3. Funded buy-sell and equity mechanics. If a founder dies, becomes disabled or departs, the operating agreement should say who buys the equity, at what value, and with what money. An unfunded buy-sell clause is a promise the company may not be able to keep, and how it is funded matters too (see E4).

The same logic applies to a sponsor itself. LPAs commonly contain key person provisions for the GP’s investment team. A GP that is careful about its own key person risk should expect the same discipline at the portfolio companies it controls.

E2Sizing key person coverage

Carriers generally accept one of three methods: a multiple of compensation (often 5 to 15 times, lower at older ages), the cost of replacing the person, or the person’s contribution to earnings. Replacement cost alone understates the loss, because it leaves out lost relationships and disrupted strategy.

Key person premiums are generally not tax-deductible, and the death benefit is received tax-free if the §101(j) rules in E6 are met. For multi-life COLI programs, Munich Re’s 2025 carrier survey puts the standard guaranteed-issue maximum at $10 million per life.

E3COLI on the same key people

Key person coverage answers one question: what happens to the company if a critical person dies. Corporate-owned life insurance (COLI) on those same people answers a second one: how the company pays to keep, replace and reward them while they are alive. A program that looks at risk as a whole addresses both.

COLI is permanent, cash-value life insurance that the company owns and is the beneficiary of, written on one key person or a defined group of executives. Companies commonly use it to:

  • Indemnify the company at death, the same job key person coverage does, sized to the economic loss.
  • Build a balance-sheet asset. Cash value grows inside the policy and can be reached through policy loans, withdrawals or surrender, subject to tax and to a reduced death benefit.
  • Informally fund nonqualified deferred compensation, SERPs and retention plans. This is the money behind the “golden handcuffs” that keep the leadership bench in place, which is the bench a succession plan depends on.
  • Fund buy-sell and redemption obligations so that the equity mechanics in the operating agreement are backed by real money.
  • Support lender covenants and split-dollar arrangements for senior executives.

Why this matters to the Nvidia lesson: in an exit driven by misconduct, a term key person policy pays nothing, because no one has died. A COLI program’s cash value is still an asset the company can draw on. It can help fund an interim leader, retention bonuses for the next tier, executive search, and deferred compensation already owed to the people who stay.

Table E1Key person term vs. COLI

FeatureKey person termCOLI (permanent, company-owned)
Pays the company on deathYesYes
Value available after a resignation or for-cause exitNoYes, through cash value, though early values are often low and gains on surrender are taxed as ordinary income
Builds a balance-sheet assetNoYes
Informally funds deferred comp and retention plansNoYes
Subject to IRC §101(j) notice and consentYes, when employer-ownedYes

E4Buy-sell funding after Connelly

In Connelly v. United States (2024), a unanimous Supreme Court held that life insurance proceeds a company receives to redeem a deceased owner’s shares count toward the company’s value for estate tax, with no offset for the obligation to buy the shares. In that case the IRS valued the company at $6.86 million, against the estate’s $3.86 million. Any company whose buy-sell is funded with company-owned policies should review the structure.

Gallagher’s guidance is that entity redemption can still work when an owner’s estate is under the federal estate tax exemption, that cross-purchase suits higher-value businesses, and that split-dollar hybrids remain untested with the IRS.

Table E2Buy-sell structures after Connelly

StructureHow it worksTrade-offs
Entity redemptionThe company owns the policies and buys back the sharesSimple, with one policy per owner. After Connelly, proceeds can raise the estate’s taxable value. Subject to §101(j)
Cross-purchaseEach owner owns a policy on the othersAvoids the Connelly problem and gives the buyers a higher basis. Many policies when there are many owners
Trusteed or LLC-ownedA trust or special-purpose entity owns one policy per owner and carries out the purchaseFewer policies with cross-purchase treatment. Needs careful drafting
Wait-and-seeThe company has the first option to buy, the owners the secondFlexible. Still needs funding in place

Two cautions. Moving existing company-owned policies into a new structure can trigger the transfer-for-value rule, which can make the death benefit taxable, so get tax advice first. And follow the agreement’s own valuation procedure; the owners in Connelly did not. A disability trigger in a buy-sell is funded with disability buy-out insurance, not life insurance.

E5When the key person leaves but doesn’t die

A resignation or for-cause exit leaves the company holding a policy on someone who no longer works there. The options are to keep it, surrender it for its cash value, sell or transfer it to the departing executive, or convert it into a split-dollar arrangement. Each has tax consequences.

If the company keeps the policy, a tax-free death benefit depends on the original §101(j) consent and on the person having been a director or highly compensated employee when the policy was issued, because the “employee within 12 months of death” exception lapses a year after departure.

E6IRC §101(j) and Form 8925

Since the Pension Protection Act of 2006, IRC §101(j) has governed employer-owned life insurance issued after August 17, 2006. That includes key person, entity buy-sell, endorsement split-dollar and term policies. The insured must receive written notice and give written consent before the policy is issued.

An exception must also apply: the insured was an employee within 12 months of death, was a director or highly compensated employee when the policy was issued, or the proceeds go to the insured’s heirs or buy their equity. If either step fails, the death benefit above the premiums paid becomes taxable income. The company must also attach Form 8925 to its tax return every year the policies are in force.

For every company, this is an annual compliance item. For acquirers and sponsors, it is also a diligence item. An acquired company’s existing COLI with missing consents is a hidden tax liability on the very event the policy was bought for. A missed consent can be cured only by the tax return due date for the year the policy was issued, and never after a death.

A material change to an older policy can bring it under the rules. At every acquisition, recapitalization and leadership change, confirm that consents are on file, that Form 8925 has been filed, and that the insureds still fit the right exceptions.

FixInventory every company-owned policy, across the whole portfolio for sponsors. Match each one to a purpose (indemnification, benefit funding, buy-sell) and to the people the investment thesis depends on. Then size and structure the key person, COLI and buy-sell coverage together with the succession plan and the D&O/EPL program, rather than as separate purchases.

Back to the map

FThree moments, one matrix

The Nvidia sequence combined all three of the moments that test a management liability program. Here is how those moments typically play out at a founder-led private company, sponsor-backed or not.

Table F1Three moments that test a management liability program

MomentTypical claimantPolicy that should respondCommon gapPre-crisis fix
Management changeover (misconduct, for-cause exit, sudden departure)Departing founder/executiveEPL; D&O for related fiduciary allegationsInsured-vs-insured; EPL carve-outs for contracts and equity; investigation costs not coveredIvI carve-backs; coordinated EPL/D&O; investigation coverage
Shareholder action (minority investors, co-investors, derivative demand)Minority holders; LPs in co-invest vehiclesD&O Side A/B; entity coverageCapacity exclusion for sponsor designees; shared limits; “other insurance” disputes with the GPLCapacity carve-back; primary-over-sponsor wording; Side A DIC
Both, followed by a transaction or restructuringAcquirer, lender, trustee, former boardRun-off D&O; go-forward D&O; Side A DICChange-in-control trigger missed; run-off and go-forward wordings misaligned; insolvency limits exhaustedSix-year run-off; aligned wordings; claw-back; priority of payments

Sources (62)

The Nvidia event

  1. NVIDIA Form 8-K: NVIDIA Announces CEO Transition
  2. NVIDIA Form 8-K (Nov 11, 2026)
  3. ABC News: Nvidia stock falls after company opens probe into CEO Jensen Huang
  4. Reuters via TimesLIVE: Nvidia’s shares slide as CEO probed over spy claims
  5. Value Add VC: Nvidia faces securities suit and succession uncertainty
  6. Stock Analysis: Shareholder lawsuit against Nvidia and Huang
  7. InsiderFinance: Congressional scrutiny of the Nvidia investigation
  8. Reuters: Nvidia’s insurance protects board but not company coffers from litigation (Nov 17, 2026)

Private company claims data and market conditions

  1. Gallagher: Private company litigation (AIG claims data)
  2. Chubb: Private Company Risk Survey
  3. Risk & Insurance: Allianz on rising D&O exposures
  4. WTW: Insurance Marketplace Realities 2027, D&O (Oct 2026)
  5. Lockton Market Update: Executive Risk (July 2026)
  6. Lockton Market Update: Executive Risk (March 2026)
  7. Lockton Market Update: Executive Risk (Dec 2025)
  8. Gallagher: The D&O risks underwriters will be watching in 2027
  9. Beazley: Private Company D&O market shifts (Apr 2026)
  10. Insurance Business: Travelers on private company D&O risk
  11. Aon: Navigating today’s private and nonprofit market
  12. Gallagher: 2026 Guide to Private Company D&O Insurance
  13. D&O Diary: Private company risks and exposures

D&O policy forms

  1. Chubb: ForeFront Portfolio private company D&O highlights
  2. Chubb: ForeFront Portfolio 3.0
  3. Philadelphia Insurance: Private Company Protection Plus highlights
  4. Hiscox: Private D&O coverage part
  5. AIG: D&O policy form (crisis coverage)
  6. Nexus Underwriting: Private company D&O coverage section

Sides of D&O, Side A DIC, severability and extensions

  1. Foley: Side A DIC coverage
  2. PLUS: How broad is your Side A DIC?
  3. IRMI: Severability provision in D&O applications
  4. Hunton: D&O extensions you may be missing
  5. Harvard Law School Forum: Oversight failures on workplace misconduct (LACERS v. Sanford)

Defense costs, allocation and EPL

  1. Hinshaw: Defense cost issues under D&O policies
  2. Policyholder Pulse: Allocation clauses in D&O and E&O policies
  3. Claims Journal: EPL coverage issues
  4. New York 11 NYCRR 71.3 (defense within limits)

Capacity exclusion, sponsors and portfolio companies

  1. Dorsey: Goggin and the D&O capacity exclusion
  2. D&O Diary: Goggin and insured capacity
  3. McGuireWoods: Insurance tips for PE funds and portfolio companies
  4. Farella Braun + Martel: Do you know what’s in your portfolio company’s D&O?

Run-off, change in control and insolvency

  1. McGriff: D&O runoff policies for private companies
  2. WTW: Understanding runoff insurance
  3. Amwins via Insurance Journal: D&O runoff in M&A
  4. Proskauer: D&O insurance in times of distress
  5. WTW: On bankruptcy watch
  6. WTW: Is your D&O program bankruptcy ready?
  7. Lockton: Bankruptcy court rulings highlight the importance of D&O (First Brands)

Crisis communications and reputational risk

  1. Business Insurance: Beazley-led reputational risk cover
  2. Lockton: Crisis management solutions
  3. Lockton: Beazley reputational risk flyer
  4. WTW: Reputational Crisis Insurance
  5. AIG UK: PrivateEdge crisis communications

Key person, COLI and executive benefits

  1. Cincinnati Insurance: Life insurance for key employees
  2. MetLife: COLI best practices
  3. NFP: Executive benefits are evolving beyond retention
  4. Munich Re: COLI/BOLI underwriting trends 2025

IRC §101(j) and Form 8925

  1. IRS Form 8925 (draft form and instructions)
  2. IRS Notice 2009-48 via Tax Notes
  3. Plante Moran: Tax-free life insurance payouts
  4. The Florida Bar Journal: Employer-owned life insurance after the PPA

Buy-sell and Connelly

  1. Loeb & Loeb: Supreme Court rules in Connelly
  2. Gallagher: Business succession planning in the Connelly era

General information only, not legal, tax or insurance advice.